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Introduction 
 
 
No Dream in Georgia? 
Domestic Quarrels and Local Elections Show: “Winner Takes All” Likely to Continue 
Sonja Schiffers and Franziska Smolnik 
Even though the country is a regional frontrunner, Georgian democracy is not yet con-
solidated. Parliamentary elections in 2016 saw the governing Georgian Dream returned 
with a constitutional majority. The October 2017 local elections brought the ruling 
party another sweeping victory. Despite Georgian Dream’s overwhelming electoral suc-
cesses, the country faces voter apathy. Alongside lack of parliamentary controls and a 
fragmentation of the party-political spectrum this does not bode well for consolidating 
democracy in the near future. 
 
The governing Georgian Dream (GD) scored 
a resounding victory in the October 2016 
parliamentary election, winning 115 of the 
150 seats. That just exceeds the threshold 
of 113 required to amend the constitution. 
The result dashed hopes that the transition 
from a presidential to a parliamentary sys-
tem would foster stable party politics with 
at least two strong camps. It had been widely 
expected that former President Mikheil 
Saakashvili’s United National Movement 
(UNM) would mount an earnest challenge. 
Instead the UNM collapsed from 65 to 27 
seats (but remained the second-largest party). 
Rather than by disagreement with the UNM’s 
policies, however, the defeat was driven by 
voters’ personal rejection of ex-president 
Mikheil Saakashvili in a political environ-
ment strongly fixated on individuals. 
Other political forces were largely wiped 
out. The Free Democrats and the Republi-
can Party – both small but courted by the 
West – failed to win a seat between them. 
Potentially even worse for their future 
prospects is the departure of many leading 
figures after the defeat. It remains in the 
balance whether these parties can recover 
from the blow, or whether new formations 
emerging from the election aftermath might 
gain an earnest footing. In the first place, 
the founding of new groups suggests fur-
ther fragmentation. 
Weak Opposition – 
Inadequate Controls 
Georgian Dream benefits in particular from 
discord within the main opposition party. In 
January 2017 21 of the UNM’s 27 deputies 
quit their parliamentary group to form the 
breakaway Movement for Liberty – Euro-
pean Georgia (EG). The split was preceded 
by months of conflict within the party re-
volving largely around the role of its founder 
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Saakashvili. The breakaway group had been 
calling for more distance from the UNM’s 
mastermind. Internal rivalries were only 
one aspect; they also felt a realignment was 
essential to win back support beyond the 
party’s core base. Supporters of the rump 
UNM continue to stress their loyalty to 
Saakashvili. Although he has been stripped 
of his Georgian citizenship and remains 
abroad, the leadership is kept open for him. 
The post is likely to remain vacant for some 
time to come, given that Saakashvili faces 
prosecution for abuse of power if he returns, 
and possible imprisonment. 
The dominance of Georgian Dream 
places question marks over the effective-
ness of (parliamentary) control over govern-
ment, the long-term stability of the division 
of powers and ultimately the consolidation 
of democracy as a whole. Critics of Georgian 
Dream see the danger of de facto one-party 
rule – as previously under Saakashvili’s UNM. 
The depth of the divisions and the ubiqui-
tousness of zero-sum thinking is illustrated 
very clearly by two central domestic issues: 
the constitutional reform process and the 
conflict over ownership and control of 
broadcaster Rustavi 2. 
Constitutional Reform – 
Uncompromising Stances 
Constitutional reform is a central project 
for Georgian Dream’s second term. The 
declared goal is to complete the transition 
from a presidential to a parliamentary 
system, which was initiated in 2010 and 
passed by parliament in 2013. Georgian 
Dream is in a very comfortable position, 
possessing a majority large enough to pass 
constitutional amendments on its own. Op-
ponents of reform accuse Georgian Dream 
of exploiting its legislative dominance to 
rewrite the constitution in a manner that 
will primarily boost its own power. 
New modalities for presidential and par-
liamentary elections are especially contro-
versial. According to the new constitution 
the president will no longer be chosen 
directly by the populace, but indirectly 
through an election board. Moreover, the 
future role of the president will be a rather 
ceremonial one. The governing party argues 
that both these changes are appropriate in 
a parliamentary system, while the opposi-
tion and the current head of state regard 
them as an attempt to abolish independent 
institutions with popular legitimacy of 
their own. Although the reform would no 
longer affect the current President Giorgi 
Margvelashvili, it nevertheless appears to 
represent an affront because he has become 
one of the government’s foremost critics. 
The opposition and various NGOs also 
accuse Georgian Dream of tailoring the 
parliamentary voting system to serve its 
own needs. Under the new constitution, 
parliamentary elections will move to an 
exclusively proportional system. While the 
opposition supports this provision, it sees 
no reason to wait until 2024 for the change 
to come into effect. As matters currently 
stand, the next parliament would still 
be elected under the current arrangement 
that combines proportional representa-
tion and first-past-the-post – which could 
again secure a large majority for Georgian 
Dream. 
Perhaps even more than disputes over sub-
stance, the procedural fight demonstrates 
the deep divide between ruling party and op-
position. The president boycotted the reform 
commission from the moment it was estab-
lished by Georgian Dream, and European 
Georgia collected 150,000 signatures calling 
for a referendum on the new constitution. 
The governing party forced first and second 
readings through parliament in June 2017. 
Attempts by the Council of Europe’s Venice 
Commission to mediate between the two 
sides came to nothing. Just days after the 
president and twenty opposition parties 
presented a counter-proposal, Georgian 
Dream passed the constitutional amend-
ments with only marginal concessions in a 
third reading on 26 September. President 
Margvelashvili vetoed the draft bill – albeit 
to no avail. After Georgian Dream used its 
parliamentary majority to override the presi-
dent’s veto, Margvelashvili ultimately gave 
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in and signed the amendments into law on 
19 October 2017. 
Rustavi 2 and Fights Over 
Media Ownership 
Changes in the media landscape provide 
further insights into the state of the coun-
try’s democracy. It would seem strangely 
coincidental that all three parties elected 
to the Georgian parliament in October 2016 
enjoyed privileged access to broadcasting – 
television being Georgia’s most important 
information medium. That explains the 
great national and international attention 
devoted to the dispute over ownership of 
the TV station Rustavi 2. Kibar Khalvashi, 
the station’s former owner, alleges he was 
forced to sell it for less than its real value 
in 2006. Rustavi 2 fell into the hands of sup-
porters of then President Saakashvili, with 
repercussions for its political stance. After 
Georgian Dream came to power in 2012 
and Saakashvili was voted out of office in 
2013, Rustavi 2 maintained its allegiance 
to the UNM, and remained very critical 
toward Georgian Dream. For some years 
Khalvashi – whose brother is a Georgian 
Dream deputy – has been pursuing legal 
action to have the 2006 sale annulled. 
The Rustavi 2 dispute needs to be seen in 
a wider context of changes in the Georgian 
media landscape since 2012. Another sta-
tion, the very popular Imedi TV, had been 
forced to close in 2007 under Saakashvili, 
and reopened in 2009 under new leader-
ship, now loyal to him. After Georgian 
Dream took power it was returned to the 
heirs of the (meanwhile deceased) former 
owner. Imedi TV is now regarded as the 
mouthpiece of the Georgian Dream govern-
ment. This makes Rustavi 2 the last influ-
ential broadcaster within Georgia that is 
critical towards the government. Many fear 
that it would come too close to the state 
leadership if it were returned to the former 
owner – as occurred with Imedi TV. 
The Rustavi 2 case went through all the 
appeals. Finally, in early March 2017, 
the Supreme Court of Georgia ruled that 
the station was to be returned to its origi-
nal owner. The ruling provoked vocal pro-
tests, with many renowned civil society 
organisations questioning the impartiality 
of the courts over Rustavi 2. They saw the 
decision as an attempt by the government 
to bring the main opposition media outlet 
under its control. International watchdogs 
like Amnesty International and the Council 
of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights 
also criticise the Georgian judiciary’s lack 
of independence in this and other cases. 
As with the constitutional reform, the 
incident called an international body into 
play. In a legally binding interim measure, 
which it issues only in exceptional cases, 
the European Court of Human Rights called 
for the Georgian Supreme Court ruling 
to be suspended indefinitely and urged 
the Georgian government to “abstain from 
interfering” in the “editorial policies” of 
Rustavi 2. Whether or not political pressure 
was actually exerted upon the Georgian 
Supreme Court, the future of Rustavi 2 – 
and of the country’s media pluralism as a 
whole – appears to remain uncertain. 
Local Elections and the Electorate 
Despite garnering less (international) inter-
est than last year’s parliamentary elections, 
Georgia’s recent local elections had been 
discussed as potential reality check for the 
ruling party’s popularity – in particular 
given the domestic controversies. Special 
attention was accorded to the mayoral elec-
tions in the capital Tbilisi with its popula-
tion of 1.1 million (more than a quarter of 
Georgia’s overall 3.7 million). Here, as in 
three of the other four self-governed cities, 
the Georgian Dream candidate won in the 
first round. Georgian Dream’s sweeping 
success was facilitated not least by the strong 
fragmentation of the party landscape and 
in particular of the opposition: In Tbilisi 
eight candidates vied for the mayoral office, 
four of them nominated by opposition par-
ties with a decidedly pro-Western orienta-
tion. Country-wide, Georgian Dream won 
almost 56 percent of the proportional vote 
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and all but six of the mayoral races. After 
the UNM’s withdrawal from the runoff, 
only four districts will see a second round. 
Given the campaign financing figures, 
the election results come as little surprise: 
Between 1 July and 15 October 2017 Geor-
gian Dream received 11.6 million Georgian 
lari in donations (approximately €4 mil-
lion), compared to less than 1 million Geor-
gian lari for European Georgia and approxi-
mately 108 thousand for UNM. The National 
Democratic Institute criticised the uneven-
ness of the political playing field in the run-
up to the elections, even though on election 
day only minor violations were noted, and 
fundamental freedoms were generally 
respected. 
Before the local elections of October 2017 
it seemed that support for the governing 
party had fallen. A survey by the National 
Democratic Institute published in June 
2017 found only 23 percent support for 
Georgian Dream, compared to 40 percent 
in November 2016, shortly after the parlia-
mentary election. Despite the crushing 
parliamentary majority won by Georgian 
Dream, no Georgian party, however, has 
succeeded in securing a long-term electoral 
base. That includes Georgian Dream, whose 
performance in the recent local elections 
should not be misread as proving other-
wise. Indeed, political cleavages are vague 
and voters tend not to understand parties 
as committed advocates of particular inter-
ests and programmes. According to a survey 
by the International Republican Institute 
published in March 2017, only 13 percent 
of respondents have faith in Georgian Dream 
to solve the country’s most urgent prob-
lems; more than 70 percent are negative 
towards political parties in general. 
Outlook 
The constitutional reform process and the 
Rustavi 2 dispute reveal a number of cen-
tral obstacles to a consolidation of democ-
racy. Politics remains a “winner takes all” 
affair, with vested and power interests 
coming before pluralism and division of 
powers. Fewer than 52 percent of the elec-
torate bothered to vote at all in the parlia-
mentary vote (and less than 46 percent 
in the local elections of October 2017). Of 
those who did vote in 2016, less than 50 
percent chose Georgian Dream in the PR 
ballot that decided 77 of the 150 seats. 
Georgian Dream owes its narrow constitu-
tion-amending majority to its success in the 
first-past-the-post constituency ballot that 
distributed the other 73 seats (of which it 
won all but two). Yet Georgian Dream is still 
unwilling to seek broader consensus or make 
compromises with the opposition. With 
its huge majority it can always outvote the 
parliamentary opposition and override 
any veto by the critical president. Georgian 
Dream’s recent success in the local elections 
will likely further boost its resolve. But rid-
ing roughshod over its opponents will do 
little for public confidence in parliamen-
tary democracy. At the same time, the oppo-
sition is showing little willingness to com-
promise either. In the near future, Georgian 
(domestic) politics will thus likely remain 
characterised by fickleness and stalemate. 
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